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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
JUDGING THE POLITICAL AND POLITICAL JUDGING:
JUSTICE SCALIA AS CASE STUDY
RICHARD L. HASEN *
INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, near the end of the Supreme Court’s 2012 term, the Court
decided two cases of great national significance. In one case, United States
v. Windsor, 1 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a portion of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which aimed at limiting the rights of
same-sex couples under federal law. It was a ruling presaging Obergefell v.
Hodges, 2 the 2015 case in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of
same-sex couples to marry.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in Windsor. He protested that the Court
had “no power under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically
adopted legislation.” 3 To Justice Scalia, the majority’s due process and equal
protection constitutional analysis was especially wrongheaded in its failure
to defer to the will of the American people, as expressed through its representatives in Congress.
Scalia’s statement in Windsor was rich in irony, because it came only a
day after he joined a Supreme Court majority in Shelby County v. Holder, 4 a
case striking down a key portion of the federal Voting Rights Act. The
stricken part of the Act singled out states with a history of racial discrimination in voting that had to get federal approval, or preclearance, before making

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. This Address builds

upon ideas first presented in Richard L. Hasen, After Scalia: The Future of United States Election Law ,
17A0(5,.$+ƿ 1 (Koji Higashikawa trans.,2017) (Japan), and RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF
CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION (2018). It is a revised version of
a Keynote Address delivered at “The Supreme Court and American Politics,” a symposium held October 
17, 2017 at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. Richard L. Hasen, Keynote Address at the Chicago-Kent
Law Review Symposium: The Supreme Court and American Politics (Oct. 17, 2017). Thanks to symposium participants for useful comments and suggestions.
 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604±05 (2015).
 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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any changes to their voting rules, and to prove that their proposed changes
would not make minority voters worse off. 5
In Shelby County, the Court in a 5–4 decision struck down part of a law
that Congress enacted in 1965 and which large bipartisan congressional majorities had repeatedly reenacted and expanded. 6 What’s worse, the constitutional theory relied upon by the majority—that preclearance deprived
covered states of their “equal sovereignty”—was new and hardly inevitable. 7
Why did Justice Scalia believe in deference to the democratic processes
in one case and not the other? He gave us a clue in the Shelby County case’s
oral argument. Justice Scalia disagreed with Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s suggestion that Congress was entitled to make a judgment that continued racial problems justified the continuation of the preclearance part of the
Act:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, maybe it was making that judgment, Mr. Verrilli. . . . The problem here, however, is . . . that the initial enactment of
this legislation . . . in a time when the need for it was so much more abundantly clear was—in the Senate, there—it was double-digits against it.
And that was only a 5-year term. Then, it is reenacted 5 years later, again
for a 5-year term. Double-digits against it in the Senate. Then it was reenacted for 7 years. Single digits against it. Then enacted for 25 years, 8
Senate votes against it.
And this last enactment, not a single vote in the Senate against it. And the
House is pretty much the same. Now, I don’t think that’s attributable to
the fact that it is so much clearer now that we need this. I think it is attributable, very likely attributable, to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement. It’s been written about. Whenever a society
adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them through the
normal political processes. . . .

....
Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act. Who is going to
vote against that in the future? 8

In 2009, when the Court first considered the constitutionality of the
2006 Voting Rights Act renewal, Scalia also remarked at oral argument on
the Senate’s 98–0 approval of the law. The Justice said: “[T]he Israeli Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be something

5. Id. at 2631.
6. Id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1209–11 (2016).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–48, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96), 2013 WL
6908203, at *46–48.
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wrong there.” 9 He asked counsel defending the law whether he really thought
any incumbent would vote against extending the Act. 10
The Sanhedrin remark caught the attention of New York Times reporter
Adam Liptak, who dryly noted that: “Justice Scalia was not announcing a
universal principle. Indeed, he almost certainly does not think that every
unanimous legislative act is problematic. In 1986, for instance, the Senate
approved Justice Scalia’s nomination to the Supreme Court by a vote of 98
to 0.” 11
It was not just race where Justice Scalia saw what he considered to be
“special interests” messing with the “normal political processes” and thereby
obviating the need for judicial deference. Justice Scalia made this point on
the question of gay rights as well.
In the 1996 case Romer v. Evans, 12 the Court struck down a voter-initiated state constitutional amendment in Colorado repealing laws barring discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The Court held that the
amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
by denying these groups certain legal protection without rational basis. 13
Justice Scalia issued a vehement dissent, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that the law was motivated by anti-gay animus. The Justice again
pointed to supposed defects in the political process. He wrote, relying upon
certain stereotypes about gays and lesbians, that:
The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they
possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and
statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality. 14

Justice Scalia’s shifting deference to democratic procedures and the political process might be no more than rhetorical flourishes, offered in opinions applying neutral principles to determine the scope of the Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause. Notes about democratic dysfunction might provide
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193 (2009) (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 1146055, at *51.
10. Id.
11. Adam Liptak, Sidebar: On and Off the Bench, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia,
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html [perma.cc/67ZJ-WE5B].
12. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
13. Id. at 626–27.
14. Id. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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nothing more than what Justice Elena Kagan once referred to in a different
context as “extra icing on a cake already frosted.” 15
Or the shifting deference might provide a window into the Justice’s decisionmaking, explaining part of the reason for the Justice’s hostility to racebased affirmative action, voting rights cases, and gay rights legislation. Perhaps he viewed these laws as the product of a dysfunctional political process,
although he never explained why some organizing for political action was
more objectionable than others.
In this Address, I consider through the lens of Justice Scalia’s opinions
the role that views of the political process play, at least rhetorically, in how
Supreme Court Justices decide cases. I focus on Justice Scalia’s contradictory views on self-dealing and incumbency protection across a range of
cases, comparing campaign finance, on the one hand, to partisan gerrymandering, voter identification laws, political patronage, and ballot access rules
on the other. In this context, I argue that the defects in the political process
he sometimes flagged appeared to do little work, and that his decisions are
better understood by his ideological commitments to what Chicago-Kent
Professor Steven Heyman calls “conservative libertarianism.” 16 Scalia’s
views on self-dealing appeared to reflect rather than drive his legal analysis.
The discussion draws and expands upon ideas in my 2018 book, The
Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption. 17 I
use Justice Scalia as an example in this Address not because he was necessarily more contradictory in his judging of the political realm than any of the
other Justices, but because I have been focusing on his writings for the last
few years as I worked on the book.
Part II describes Justice Scalia’s contradictory approaches on questions
of self-dealing and incumbency. Part III argues that, the contradictions lined
up with the Justice’s ideological and partisan commitments, and that this is
hardly unique to Justice Scalia. Finally, Part IV offers three lessons to be
learned from this case study for the interaction of the Court, the political
branches, and election law.

15. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1093 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
16. See generally Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231 (2014).
17. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS
OF DISRUPTION (2018).
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA AND SELF-DEALING: THE CONTRADICTIONS
A. Campaign Finance
I begin with a description of Justice Scalia’s contradictory approach to
politicians’ self-dealing, starting with campaign finance.
Although many people are familiar with the Supreme Court’s controversial 2010 opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 18
holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited
sums in candidate elections, the case’s roots go back to dissents by Justice
Scalia and Justice Kennedy in a 1990 case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce. 19 The Court in Austin upheld a Michigan state campaign finance
law barring business corporations from spending money from their general
treasury funds on election ads. 20 The corporation instead could raise money
and control a separate “political action committee,” or “PAC.” 21 Michigan’s
law exempted media corporations, like corporate-owned newspapers or television stations, providing news and commentary 22 It also did not apply to
limit spending by labor unions, as the parallel federal law did. 23
With Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Scalia dissenting, the Supreme
Court upheld Michigan’s PAC requirement for corporate spending in elections. 24 In a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo, 25 the Court held that campaign limits could only be upheld under the First Amendment if they were aimed at
preventing the appearance or actuality of “corruption,” which the Court had
defined as roughly akin to bribery and undue influence. 26 Despite this, the
Austin Court held that Michigan’s corporate spending limit law was justified
to prevent what it termed a “different type of corruption in the political arena:
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 27
Justice Scalia tartly rejected the “antidistortion” argument. He began
his dissenting opinion by flagging what he saw as censorship allowed by

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
See 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 654–55.
Id. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 666–67 (majority opinion).
Id. at 665 n.4.
Id. at 668–69.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 26–29.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
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Michigan’s law, calling it “Orwellian,” and a big focus of his dissent in Austin was what he viewed as the self-interest of politicians in passing these
laws. 28
Scalia wrote that an “incumbent politician who says he welcomes full
and fair debate is no more to be believed than the entrenched monopolist
who says he welcomes full and fair competition.” 29 He further suggested that
the reason Michigan regulated the spending of business corporations and not
labor unions was because labor unions in Michigan, the state that produced
many American automobiles, had considerable political power. 30 Union political power, too, was somewhat less legitimate in his eyes.
Justice Scalia made similar points in other campaign finance cases, emphasizing self-dealing as a reason to strike down these laws. Indeed, the role
of incumbency protection took center stage in his partial dissent in the 2003
case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 31 The case considered the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, more commonly known as the McCain–Feingold law. The law reined in so-called “soft
money” and “issue advocacy” which had rendered earlier federal campaign
finance law mostly ineffective. 32 The Supreme Court in McConnell reaffirmed Austin, 33 seven years before the Court in Citizens United overruled
Austin as well as this part of McConnell. 34
Justice Scalia opened his partial dissent in McConnell by calling it a
“sad day for the freedom of speech” 35 and raising the incumbency issue:
We are governed by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criticism
of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of giving such
criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of
the commercial and the not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism
of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of
their general funds; and forbids national-party use of “soft” money to fund
“issue ads” that incumbents find so offensive. 36

Justice Scalia’s professed concern about incumbency and self-dealing
led him to be very skeptical of campaign finance limits challenged under the
First Amendment, and he almost never voted to sustain a challenged limit.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
part).
36.

Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 692.
Id.
See 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
See id. at 122–29 (discussing rise of soft money and issue advocacy).
Id. at 211.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
Id.
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His writings suggested that the dangers of incumbency and self-dealing provided a reason for extra judicial scrutiny of laws regulating the political process.
And yet, his concern about incumbency protection and self-dealing did
not extend beyond the campaign finance cases. Indeed, in four other areas,
Justice Scalia either minimized the dangers of self-dealing, professed an inability of the courts to handle the problem, or even celebrated the side effects
of political self-interest.
B. Partisan Gerrymandering
Consider partisan gerrymandering, which is very much in the news as
the Court returns to the issue this term in Gill v. Whitford, 37 the partisan gerrymandering case out of Wisconsin. It is sometimes said that gerrymandering
allows legislators to choose their voters rather than the other way around.
When legislators draw district lines to help themselves or their political parties, they sometimes engage in some of the rawest political self-dealing imaginable, and the question in Whitford is whether the Court will put the
brakes on some of the most egregious activity.
For a long time, the Supreme Court refused to get involved in most districting and apportionment disputes, finding them to be “nonjusticiable” political questions without judicially manageable standards. Beginning in
Baker v. Carr 38 in 1962, the Court allowed some challenges to districting.
After cases such as Reynolds v. Sims, 39 recognizing the one person, one vote
rule, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, which protected minority voting rights in districting and other cases. 40 Since the 1990s, the Court has held
that taking race too much into account violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution, putting states in the position of navigating
between the race-conscious requirements of the Voting Rights Act and the
Court-created rule not to make race a predominant factor in redistricting. 41
Even with all of these rules in place, politicians have still been able to
draw districts that give partisan advantage to one side or another. For example, in ongoing litigation over congressional districts in North Carolina, the

37. 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.) (postponing jurisdiction and setting the case for argument).
38. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
39. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
40. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–30 (1966) (describing circumstances of
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and rejecting constitutional challenge to its preclearance
provisions).
41. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). On the evolution of this claim, see Richard L.
Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 57 ALA. L. REV. 365 (2015).
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Republican majority legislature recently passed a redistricting plan that creates ten safe Republican districts and three safe Democratic districts, even
though the Republican–Democratic split in the state is about even. North
Carolina Representative David Lewis, when asked why he drew ten of thirteen districts for Republicans in a fifty–fifty state, astonishingly replied: “because I do not believe it’s possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and
two Democrats.” 42
The fight to get the Court to rein in such partisan gerrymandering so far
has been unsuccessful. In a 1986 case, Davis v. Bandemer, 43 the Supreme
Court agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable. However,
the Bandemer standard proved uncertain in theory and impossible in fact: for
eighteen years after Bandemer there were no successful partisan gerrymandering cases. 44
The Supreme Court returned to the issue in the 2004 case, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 45 involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering in the creation of
congressional districts for the state of Pennsylvania. The Court divided into
three groups. Justice Scalia, for four conservative Justices, took the position
that Bandemer was wrong on the question of justiciability because there were
no “judicially manageable” standards for courts to apply. He believed courts
were without the power to hear such claims. 46 The four liberal Justices believed Bandemer was right that these kinds of cases are justiciable but wrong
on the standard—and the dissenters set forth a variety of proposed standards
to police gerrymandering. 47
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself alone, stood in the middle. He
agreed with the liberals that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable,
but agreed with Justice Scalia and the other conservative Justices that each
of the proposed gerrymandering standards did not separate permissible from
impermissible consideration of partisanship in drawing district lines. 48 The
result was that plaintiffs in Vieth lost their case but the door remained open
for future challenges. We will see in Whitford if Justice Kennedy has
changed his mind about the old standards or found a new standard, such as
42. Jim Morrill, Common Cause Challenges Partisan Gerrymandering in NC, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Aug. 5, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article93903767.html [https://perma.cc/HZX5-WGHH].
43. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
44. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing the lack of
successful partisan gerrymandering claims under the Bandemer standard).
45. Id. at 271–72.
46. Id. at 305–06.
47. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 353 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id.
at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the “efficiency gap” standard put forward by Professor Nick Stephanopoulos
and researcher Eric McGhee. 49
In perhaps the most interesting aspect of Justice Scalia’s Vieth opinion
was his admission that extreme partisan gerrymandering may well be unconstitutional even if the courts do not have the tools to police it:
Much of [Justice Stevens’s] dissent is addressed to the incompatibility of
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles. We do not disagree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the judgment
that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in impeachment
proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obligation to “try”
impeachments. The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan
gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy. . . .
. . . Justice Stevens says we “er[r] in assuming that politics is ‘an ordinary
and lawful motive’” in districting—but all he brings forward to contest
that is the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful. So
it is, and so does our opinion assume. 50

The discussion was an odd statement of judicial powerlessness, and it
was in some tension with Justice Scalia’s acceptance within Vieth itself of
the legitimacy of some partisan self-dealing. As Professor Michael Kang recently explained, 51 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth has been most responsible for setting out the idea that taking partisanship into account in drawing
district lines is “an ordinary and lawful motive” 52 in districting and that “partisan districting is a lawful and common practice.” 53 Scalia shifted the discussion to the question of how much of the legal activity crosses the line into
unconstitutional activity, and in so doing, gave wide berth for legislators to
engage in self-dealing when drawing district lines.
C. The Voting Wars
Justice Scalia was similarly unbothered by the use of raw political
power in setting the rules for voting, fights that elsewhere I’ve termed “the
voting wars.” 54 In the period since the disputed 2000 election, Republican
legislatures have passed laws generally making it harder to register and to
49. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015).
50. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–93 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
51. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 363 (2017).
52. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286.
53. Id.
54. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
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vote, and Democratic legislatures have done the opposite, with both parties
believing that such laws would give them at least a small partisan advantage. 55
One of the first voting wars cases to make it to the Supreme Court was
the 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. 56 The issue
in Crawford concerned the constitutionality of an Indiana law that required
voters to produce an acceptable form of photographic identification in order
to vote. 57 The state of Indiana justified its law as necessary to prevent voter
fraud, but the state conceded there were no cases of impersonation fraud recorded in the state, the only kind of fraud that an identification law would
prevent. 58 Plaintiffs’ counsel had their own problems in the case, having
trouble coming up with plaintiffs who did not have the right identification
and had trouble getting one to satisfy the new law. 59
As in Vieth, the Court again divided into three camps. Justice Stevens,
writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy, upheld the
law against a facial challenge. 60 According to Stevens, an identification requirement imposed only a minor burden for most voters, and the law was
justified on anti-fraud and public confidence grounds.61 Stevens reached this
opinion despite the lack of evidence the law helped on either account. He
had to go back to Boss Tweed’s day to find examples of the relevant kind of
voter fraud. 62 Stevens left open the possibility of as-applied lawsuits brought
by groups of voters who faced significant burdens in getting the free ID. 63
Justice Scalia, writing for himself, Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas,
was harsher than Stevens. He agreed the law imposed little burden on most
voters and voted to uphold the law. But he believed the law could be applied
against everyone, precluding the possibility of as-applied challenges from
voters facing special burdens obtaining the right form of identification. He
wrote that, “[t]he Indiana photo-identification law is a generally applicable,
nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and our precedents refute the view that
individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden it

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally id. (describing these voting wars).
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
Id. at 185 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 194.
See id. at 201.
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 195–96.
See id. at 195 nn.11–12.
See id. at 204 (rejecting only facial challenge to the law).
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imposes.” 64 For Justice Scalia, voters such as those who were born in concentration camps and therefore lacked a birth certificate or who were too
poor to afford the $20 fee to buy a birth certificate needed to prove identity
to get a so-called “free” identification card would simply be out of luck.
The Indiana voter identification law passed on a party-line vote, supported by Republican legislators and opposed by Democratic legislators. 65
Justice Stevens acknowledged that fact, but said that because the state also
had non-partisan reasons for passing the law, partisanship was no reason to
strike it down. 66 Justice Scalia’s opinion did not even address partisanship
concerns. The Court allowed Indiana to enforce its law despite the legislators’ likely partisan motivations and without proof that the law stopped any
real fraud or promoted voter confidence.
D. Political Patronage and Ballot Access
This part concludes with two more quick examples illustrating that Justice Scalia sometimes not only tolerated political self-dealing; he had actually praised it. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 67 the Court held
patronage hiring, firing, transferring, and promoting of non-policymaking
employees violates the First Amendment. After this 1990 case, the state of
Illinois could no longer fire an administrative assistant or security guard for
not belonging to the governor’s political party or paying party dues. The
Court held that premising non-policymaking government jobs on political
loyalty punished voters for their views protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia dissented and thought it was a good idea to give a governor the power to hire, fire, promote, and demote employees based solely on
partisan affiliation. He believed that patronage-based employment promoted
strong political parties by generating loyalty and party funds. Scalia found
this party interest to be important enough to override employees’ First
Amendment rights to be protected from punishment for failing to join—or
belonging to another—political party. He wrote in dissent:
It may well be that the Good Government Leagues of America were right,
and that Plunkitt, James Michael Curley, and their ilk were wrong; but that
is not entirely certain. As the merit principle has been extended and its
effects increasingly felt; as the Boss Tweeds, the Tammany Halls, the Pendergast Machines, the Byrd Machines, and the Daley Machines have faded

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 203 n.21 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 203–04.
497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990).
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into history; we find that political leaders at all levels increasingly complain of the helplessness of elected government, unprotected by “party discipline,” before the demands of small and cohesive interest groups. 68

And then there was New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez
Torres. 69 That 2008 case concerned a constitutional challenge to the means
by which certain New York trial court judges were nominated by parties and
placed on the general election ballot. The record showed that party insiders
controlled the nomination process, and demanded some political patronage
in exchange for political support. Party nominees were virtually guaranteed
election—Democrats in some parts of New York and Republicans in others. 70 It was possible to qualify for the ballot without being a party nominee
by collecting petition signatures, but those candidates inevitably lost. 71
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the challenge to New York’s
party nomination process for judges, but the Justices offered different reasons for reaching this result. Justice Scalia wrote a broad majority opinion,
which went much further than necessary to decide the case. He wrote that
the Constitution contained no guarantee of a “fair shot” to win an election. 72
Going even further, he noted that, “[p]arty conventions, with their attendant
‘smoke-filled rooms’ and domination by party leaders, have long been an
accepted manner of selecting party candidates.” 73 It is hard to think of more
self-dealing than the smoke-filled room, but Justice Scalia in Lopez Torres
seems to look back on it nostalgically.
Say what you will about Justice Scalia’s decisions in the partisan gerrymandering, voting wars, political patronage, and ballot access decisions.
But it is hard to say they express great concern about the dangers of incumbency and self-dealing, much less that they suggest reasons for striking down
a democratically-enacted law.
III. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE
What explains Justice Scalia’s near obsession with incumbency protection in the campaign finance cases and his acceptance, or even embrace, of
self-dealing in other cases? It is not simply that the campaign finance cases
involve the First Amendment—that’s true too of the patronage cases and
68. Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
70. Id. at 201, 205.
71. Id. at 202 (“In [the Second Circuit’s] view, because ‘one-party rule’ prevailed
within New York’s judicial districts, a candidate had a constitutional right to gain access to the party’s
convention, notwithstanding her ability to get on the general-election ballot by petition signatures.”).
72. Id. at 205–06.
73. Id. at 206.
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some of the other cases as well. Why does limiting six-figure donations by
wealthy individuals, corporations, and labor unions smack of self-dealing
while it is unobjectionable to fire the state janitor who refuses to sign up with
the governor’s political party and pay party dues?
It appears that Justice Scalia’s decisions in these cases, like his decisions in cases across many areas of constitutional and statutory law, reflect
his conservative-libertarian impulses. In the First Amendment context, Professor Heyman describes a conservative-libertarian jurisprudential approach
which advocates invalidating “laws or policies that in their view threatened
to subordinate individual liberty to liberal or progressive goals such as political reform, racial and sexual equality, gay rights, secularism, unionization,
and anti-smoking efforts.” 74 Justice Scalia was firmly in this camp.
More generally, Justice Scalia generally opposed extensive regulation
of politics by the courts and expressed dissatisfaction with such interference,
except when it came to limiting the role of money in politics or protecting
voting rights. Sometimes partisanship was worth screaming about; at other
times it was lawful, inevitable, and even a vital tool of democracy. It was his
fundamental conservatism, which seemed to drive both this jurisprudence
and his views of when the political process was failing to reach fair results. 75
IV. THREE LESSONS
Before turning to three lessons from this examination of Justice Scalia’s
views of self-dealing, it is worth emphasizing that Justice Scalia is not unique
in letting his ideological views color his jurisprudence. Consider Justice
Breyer, for example, who was on the opposite side from Justice Scalia in
most of the cases I have discussed. Justice Breyer was much more attuned to
partisan self-dealing in the context of gerrymandering 76 and voting wars 77
than in the campaign finance context. Indeed, when it came to campaign finance, Justice Breyer was perhaps the greatest proponent on the Court that
campaign finance laws deserve deference because of the special “expertise”
of elected officials in the means of campaigns (though he did acknowledge
a need to be wary of dangers of incumbency protection). 78 Justice Breyer
74. Heyman, supra note 16, at 298.
75. See HASEN, supra note 17, ch. 6 (describing Justice Scalia’s views in cases involving democracy and governance).
76. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 355–56 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 237–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a
legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments—at least where that deference does
not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective
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afforded no deference to the expertise of officials when they passed redistricting plans or passed voter identification laws.
What lessons can we learn from this look at Justice Scalia’s views of
incumbency and self-dealing?
Lesson # 1: When All Else Fails, Lower Your Expectations. Back in
2000, my mentor Dan Lowenstein wrote a book chapter entitled, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors. 79 Lowenstein’s main point was that overaggressive judicial review in
election law cases would simply empower the courts, which had no overarching theory of appropriate political competition, to say how the political
process should be regulated. That point is certainly true, but I would go further: the problem is not just that there is a lack of coherence on issues like
self-dealing on a multimember court with shifting constituencies. It is that
the Justices themselves are not internally consistent, and they are driven at
least in part by their ideology. These ideologies, however, increasingly line
up with partisanship.
This means that consistency and adherence to precedent will have only
limited value in predicting how the Supreme Court will choose or not choose
to regulate politics. For a decade, American election law turned on what Justice O’Connor had for breakfast. First, the Justice supported corporate spending limits in campaigns, then she opposed them, then supported them again
against First Amendment challenge. 80 Since Justice O’Connor’s retirement
it has been Justice Kennedy in the middle, and then if he retires, Chief Justice
Roberts. We might as well have the parties argue Gill v. Whitford just to
Justice Kennedy, and give the rest of the Justices a day off.
Political scientist Anthony Downs’s admonition to focus on the median
voter 81 has the greatest currency on the Supreme Court, and these Justices
are swing Justices precisely because their ideology is cross-cutting or tempered by pragmatism. That was less true with Justices like Justice Scalia, or
Justice Breyer.

electoral challenge.”); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (plurality opinion) (examining whether Vermont’s low contribution limits “magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where
they put challengers to a significant disadvantage”).
79. Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for
Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245–66 (David K. Ryden
ed., 2000).
80. Justice O’Connor concurred in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), which embraced the antidistortion rationale that later became a holding
in the Austin case. She dissented in Austin but concurred in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
reaffirming Austin.
81. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 7 (1957).
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Lesson # 2. The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. As we saw, when
it came to self-dealing and regulation of the political process, Justice Scalia
decided cases in line with his ideology, an ideology which, as I argue more
broadly in The Justice of Contradictions, lines up with a neo-Trumpian populist, nationalist, conservative, libertarian ideology. Sometimes, and for
some Justices, pragmatism trumps ideology.
That Justices are ideological is nothing new, and this too is not confined
to conservative Justices. Just think of Justice William Brennan, who was
pretty strongly liberal, tempering his liberalism to get to five votes when
necessary. What is new and different is the lining up of ideology and party
affiliation. Since the retirement of Justice Stevens, all the Supreme Court
Justices generally considered liberal were nominated by Democratic presidents and all the Justices considered conservative were nominated by Republican presidents.
I do not mean to suggest that the Justices are, to use Professor Justin
Levitt’s useful term, “tribal partisans.” 82 Such partisans “may favor public
action purely because the policy in question is perceived to benefit those with
a shared partisan affiliation, or because the policy in question is perceived to
injure partisan opponents, wholly divorced from—or stronger yet, contrary
to—the policymaker’s conception of the policy’s other merits.” 83
Few close observers of the Court view the Justices as tribal partisans.
They generally are not voting in a particular way to help out their own party
(although the votes and reasoning of the controversial 2000 case Bush v.
Gore, 84 ending the presidential recount in Florida, pushes against these notions). Rather, it is that these Justices were chosen for nomination because
their jurisprudential views line up with the interests and ideology of each
party.
Consider the early signals from the newest Justice, Neil Gorsuch, and
where he is likely to end up on these disputed issues. He looks to be deeply
conservative on many issues, such as the question of gay rights, with perhaps
an independent streak on criminal procedure matters, much like Justice
Scalia. 85 I have every belief Justice Gorsuch is not voting in a generally conservative way because he is a Republican or because he wants to help the

82. Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2014).
83. Id.
84. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); HASEN, supra note 54, at 11–40 (describing events leading up to Bush v.
Gore, and analyzing case).
85. Richard L. Hasen, Gorsuch is the New Scalia, Just as Trump Promised, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 27,
2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hasen-gorsuch-scalia-20170627story.html [https://perma.cc/W5LU-G75B].
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Republican party. Rather, he was chosen for this position by a Republican
President and Senate because of how he votes.
This confluence of ideology and party has two important implications
for the Supreme Court and American politics. First, if all the Democraticappointed Justices on the Court vote the same way in campaign finance, voting rights and gerrymandering cases and all the Republican-appointed Justices vote the other way, election law cases will become even more
politicized than they have been. No more Justice Stevenses, Souters, or
Whites crossing party lines. Litigants too are then more likely to frame their
disputes in partisan and ideological terms.
Second, and just as importantly, the public and other political branches
will begin to see the Court as a more partisan institution, and less sophisticated individuals will believe, and cynical politicians across the aisle will
push the argument, that these Justices are in fact engaged in tribal partisanship.
Lesson # 3: The Political Branches Will Respond Politically to a Political Court. In era of hyperpartisanship, and with the realignment I have described on the Supreme Court, the politics of the Court will influence how
the President and Senate view the Court’s work and in turn that view will
influence the Court’s future composition.
This new sharp division—not just ideological but between parties—
goes beyond election law to issues such as abortion rights, gun rights, race,
and congressional power, and it explains why we have seen the erosion of
norms over judicial nomination, filibusters and super majority rules, including the blockade of Merrick Garland, 86 Senate majority leader Harry Reid’s
blowing up of the filibuster for judicial nominations aside from the Supreme
Court, 87 Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell’s blowing up of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominations and the party line confirmation of
Justice Gorsuch, 88 and soon the demise of the “blue slip” for federal appeals
court nominations. 89 The stakes are starker and the lines are more clearly

86. HASEN, supra note 17, at 169–70 (describing Garland nomination’s failure).
87. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminates Most Filibusters on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e39fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/V7NT-LL9M].
88. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supremecourt-senate.html [https://perma.cc/XGC8-F65E].
89. Carl Hulse, Trump and McConnell See Way to Make Conservatives Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trump-mcconnell-judicial-nominees.html
[perma.cc/8JUU-YVQD] (“Mr. McConnell has also made clear his interest in eliminating the so-
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drawn, making compromise on judicial nominations less likely. When Democrats come back into power, it is possible that we will see new attempts to
pack the Court to restore a partisan advantage.
In sum, we in the United States now face a difficult confluence of two
factors. First, the Supreme Court of the United States has great power over
the rules and structure of American elections, from money in politics, to legislative districts, to voting rights and the basic question of who gets to exercise the franchise and how they may do so. Second, the Justices on the Court
have different views on constitutional questions about these election rules,
views which increasingly line up not only with the ideology of the Justices
but also with their apparent partisan affiliations.
Before long, if not already, voters likely will think of the Justices in
more partisan terms, and of the Supreme Court as a Democratic Party or
Republican Party-dominated institution. This will be especially true if the
Justices are inconsistent in applying concepts across cases, as Justice Scalia
was (and other Justices are) when it came to the dangers of incumbency protection and partisanship. Incumbency protection was enough to doom campaign finance laws but not partisan gerrymandering or biased election
administration.
The convergence of a Court with great power over election rules and an
increasing partisan divide between the liberal and conservative over how to
resolve election cases means that there will be stress on both the United
States electoral system and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, as election
rules shift along with Supreme Court majorities, and as it becomes harder for
the public to avoid seeing Justices as making political, rather than legal, decisions. It is a dangerous combination for American democracy.

called blue slip, one last arcane procedural tool that Democrats have used to slow nominees in the Judiciary Committee. If he is successful in ending that Senate tradition, which gives a senator the right to
block a judicial nominee in his or her state, it could greatly accelerate the entire process.”).

